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This study examines the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
in China. Using all listed Chinese companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as well as 4188 M&A
deals from the period of 2001–2018, we show that Chinese firms are more likely to make acquisitions during
periods of high economic policy uncertainty, which contradicts the behavior of US firms. We further show that
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely than non-SOEs to make acquisitions during periods of high eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. SOEs are less likely to use only cash for their acquisitions during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty. These results indicate the prudence of SOEs regarding acquisitions relative to non-
SOEs during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Moreover, acquisitions during periods of high economic
policy uncertainty are associated with an increase in shareholder wealth for acquirers, and this wealth effect is
more pronounced for SOEs.1. Introduction
Should a company invest under uncertainty? To date, there is no
consensus in the theoretical literature—the conclusion depends on the
nature of the investment, risk aversion behavior, and the competition
environment, among others. Under perfect competition, Hartman
(1972), Abel (1983), and Caballero (1991) show a positive relationship
between uncertainty and corporate investment. In contrast, studies based
on the real options approach to investment show a negative relationship
between uncertainty and corporate investment (see McDonald and Sie-
gel, 1986). These studies demonstrate that firms are likely to delay
irreversible investment under uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983; McDonald
and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1994).
Using a news-based proxy of economic policy uncertainty, we
examine the relationship between uncertainty and M&A deals in China.
Our empirical analysis uses all listed Chinese companies and 4188 M&A
deals in China from the period of 2001–2018. Our results show that
Chinese firms are more likely to make acquisitions during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty, which contradicts the behavior of US firms.
Besides, SOEs are less likely than non-SOEs to make acquisitions during
periods of high economic policy uncertainty. SOEs are also less likely to
use only cash for their acquisitions during periods of high economicnomy, University of Cambridge,
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vier B.V. This is an open access arpolicy uncertainty. These results indicate the prudence of SOEs regarding
acquisitions relative to non-SOEs during periods of high economic policy
uncertainty. Moreover, acquisitions during periods of high economic
policy uncertainty are associated with an increase in shareholder wealth
for acquirers, and this wealth effect is more pronounced for SOEs.
Previous empirical corporate investment literature mainly focused on
two types of uncertainty, namely political uncertainty and economic
policy uncertainty. Political uncertainty is normally captured by specific
political events which could serve as good exogenous indicators of un-
certainty. However, such political events do not provide a continuous
measure or variations of economic policy uncertainty. Baker, Bloom and
Davis (BBD hereafter) (2016) developed a news-based index to capture
economic policy uncertainty. Their index is constructed based on the
frequency of newspaper articles containing key policy uncertainty related
words.
Studies extensively explored the relationship between uncertainty
and corporate investment (see Julio and Yook, 2012; Kang et al., 2014;
Gulen and Ion, 2016; An et al., 2016; Jens, 2017). However, the rela-
tionship between economic policy uncertainty and M&As is
under-researched. This is surprising given that M&As are one of the most
important forms of corporate investment (Nguyen and Phan, 2017). To
our knowledge, only two studies, namely Nguyen and Phan (2017) andCB3 9EP, UK.
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policy uncertainty and M&As. Unlike ours, both studies focused on the
US market. There are specific reasons why we focused on China. Firstly,
the Chinese capital market has grown rapidly during the last 20 years. To
be specific, the total market capitalization of the Chinese stock market
has grown from 5320.55 billion RMB in 2000 to 43,492.40 billion RMB
in 2018, and an important feature of this growth is numerous M&A deals.
Secondly, China is best described as a transitioning economy, and, hence,
the influence of economic policy uncertainty on M&As in China may
exhibit different patterns when compared with those observed for
developed countries. Although conventional real options theory (see,
among others, Bernanke, 1983; McDonald and Siegel, 1986) predicts that
firms should delay irreversible investment under uncertainty, this theory
ignores competitive interactions among agents. Grenadier (2002) shows
that competition could erode the value of the option to wait. Yang and
Meyer (2015) claim that the speed of action is critical to gaining a
competitive advantage in fast-paced markets. This implies that, although
firms should delay irreversible investment under uncertainty, the cost of
waiting in a competitive market is high. Due to the highly competitive
environment in China (Luo, 2003; Williamson et al., 2004; Gadiesh et al.,
2007), the uncertainty–M&A relationship in China could be different
from that of the US. Consistent with this prediction, our results show that
firms in China are more likely to make acquisitions during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty—a conclusion that contradicts the behavior
of US firms.
In the light of the preceding arguments, we fill the research gap by
investigating the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and
M&As in China. In particular, we address the following research ques-
tions: 1) How does economic policy uncertainty affect the likelihood of
making acquisitions? 2) How does economic policy uncertainty affect
M&A payment methods? 3) What is the influence of economic policy
uncertainty on the acquirers’ shareholder value?
To measure economic policy uncertainty, we use economic policy
uncertainty (EPU) index of China developed by Baker et al. (2013) and
BBD (2016). This EPU index is constructed based on the frequency count
of keywords related to policy uncertainty that appear in the South China
Morning Post (SCMP). The SCMP is Hong Kong’s leading
English-language newspaper. Since the media in Hong Kong is not
regulated by Mainland China, the wording in the SCMP is less subjective
to governmental censorship. As a robustness check, we used another EPU
index of China developed by Davis et al. (2019). This alternative EPU
index is constructed based on the frequency of keywords related to policy
uncertainty that appear in two mainland Chinese newspapers, namely
the Renmin Daily and the Guangming Daily.
We examine the relationship between economic policy uncertainty
and the likelihood of making acquisitions by using panel probit model.
Our result shows a positive relationship between economic policy un-
certainty and making acquisitions. The estimations of the probit model
can be subject to potential omitted variable bias and endogeneity issue.
Unobserved factors, such as investment opportunities and economic
development, can be correlated with both economic policy uncertainty
and M&A activities. To address the concerns, firstly, we run panel probit
regression controlling for macroeconomic conditions and year fixed-
effect. Secondly, we run an IV probit model. Following Wang et al.
(2014), we use EPU index in US as an instrument of EPU index in China.
Our finds are robust to omitted-variable-bias and endogeneity concerns.
Using a subsample including only firm-year observations with completed
M&A deals, we examine the relationship between economic policy un-
certainty and payment method of M&A deals using cross-sectional probit
model. Our result shows that SOEs are less likely to use only cash for their
acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. We
further examine the relationship between economic policy uncertainty
and short-term acquirer shareholder value using cross-sectional ordinary
least squares regression. Our results show that acquisitions during pe-
riods of high economic policy uncertainty are associated with an increase
in shareholder wealth for acquirers, and this wealth effect is more591pronounced for SOEs. Since M&As are managers’ decisions rather than a
random assignment, the estimation can be subject to self-selection bias,
we use Heckman (1979) two-step self-selection correction model and the
conclusion regarding the acquirers’ shareholder value remains intact.
Furthermore, we adopt an alternative EPU index and rerun all the esti-
mations, our conclusions remain intact.
Our study contributes to the literature in two aspects. Firstly, we find
that Chinese firms are more likely to make acquisitions during periods of
high economic policy uncertainty, which contradicts the behavior of US
firms. This highlights the possible acquisition behavior difference be-
tween firms in a transition or emerging economy and firms in a devel-
oped economy during periods of high economic policy uncertainty.
Secondly, to our knowledge, this is the first study employs two measures
of EPU index in China based on different newspapers, in particular,
newspaper based in Mainland China versus newspaper based in Hong
Kong which is less subjective to governmental censorship. We find that
two EPU indexes produce a consensus finding regarding the impact of
uncertainty on M&A activities.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the literature. Section 3
outlines our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5
outlines our methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical results, and
Section 7 details the robustness checks. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
2.1. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China
Two theories explain M&A decisions. The first is the shareholder
wealth maximization theory, which argues that M&As are motived by
synergy gains from the combination of two firms (Coase, 1937). The
second is the agency theory, which explains that M&As are motived by
managerial self-interest (Halpern, 1983; Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1989) and is arguably value-destroying for the shareholders.
While the empirical evidence on the wealth effects of the bidder is mixed
in the US case (see, among others, Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade
et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2004, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Masulis et al.,
2007), most studies find a positive wealth effects of the bidder in the
Chinese case (Bhabra and Huang, 2013; Zhou et al., 2015; Chi et al.,
2011). There are several features that make the M&A deals in China
unique. Firstly, there is significant involvement of SOEs in the M&A
deals. Secondly, some of the M&A deals are often characterised by gov-
ernment intervention and political support. Bhabra and Huang (2013)
show that the bidders’ positive abnormal stock returns around the
announcement date are mainly driven by SOEs. Chi et al., (2011) show
that bidders with political advantages (measured by the percentage of
state ownership) have higher abnormal stock returns around the
announcement date. Zhou et al. (2015) compare the short-term and
long-term performance of M&As between SOE bidders and non-SOE
bidders. They show that SOE bidders outperform non-SOE bidders in
the long-term, and the results are mainly driven by the M&A deals during
the hot political periods, where there are government interventions. Ma
et al. (2016) also show that SOE bidders outperform the non-SOE bidders
in the long-term.
Other studies on M&As in China focused on the motivation of the
acquisitions and determinants of the acquirer’s return. For example,
Arnoldi and Muratova (2019) examine the government’s influence on
acquisition behavior, and find that provincial government-owned firms
and politically-tied firms are more likely to conduct unrelated acquisi-
tions within their home province compared to the unrelated
cross-province acquisitions. Lin et al. (2009) find that learning and
network factors could lead toM&As. Boateng and Bi (2014) examine how
payment methods could affect the acquirer’s return. They find that ac-
quisitions financed by stocks outperform acquisitions financed by cash in
pre-acquisition period and no significant differences between cash pay-
ment and stock payment in the post-acquisition period. Li et al. (2018)
show that linguistic distance is negatively associated with acquirer’s
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another tranche of literature investigates the motivation and perfor-
mance of cross-boarder M&A of Chinese firms (Zhu and Jog, 2012; Yang
and Hyland, 2012; Lin et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2020).
2.2. Uncertainty and corporate investment
The relationship between uncertainty and corporate investment is
unclear in the theoretical literature. The differences in the conclusions
are attributable to the differences in model assumptions and transmission
channels explored in prior work. Under the assumption of perfect
competition, risk-neutral agent, and constant returns-to-scale production
functions, Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), and Caballero (1991) show that
output price uncertainty may increase corporate investment. From the
real options framework, Bernanke (1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986),
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Abel and Eberly (1994) show that un-
certainty increases real option values, and that firms are likely to delay
irreversible investment under uncertainty. However, the real options
models ignore competitive interactions among agents. Grenadier (2002)
shows that competition could erode the value of the option to wait.
Different sources of uncertainty and form of investments have been
analysed in the empirical literature relating uncertainty to corporate
investment. Using election years in the US as a proxy of political uncer-
tainty, Julio and Yook (2012) show that firms reduce investment by 4.8%
on average during election years compare to nonelection years. Jens
(2017) shows that corporate investment declines by 5% before all elec-
tions. An et al. (2016) find a similar negative relationship between po-
litical uncertainty and corporate investment in China. Using a
news-based index of policy uncertainty, Kang et al. (2014) and Gulen
and Ion (2016) find that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with
corporate investment in the US. Furthermore, Wang et al. (2014) find a
negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty and corpo-
rate investment in China.
Another tranche of empirical literature focuses on the relationship
between uncertainty and M&As. From the risk management perspective,
Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) show the increases in cash flow uncer-
tainty encourage firms to make vertical acquisitions. From the agency
issue perspective, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) show that economic un-
certainty is positively associated with M&As. They argue that this is due
to the empire-building action of the managers and that managers believe
there are limited investor attention and immediate consequences to
conducting bad acquisitions during periods of high uncertainty. Nguyen
and Phan (2017) investigate the effects of policy uncertainty on M&As in
the US. They find that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with the
probability of making acquisition and positively associated with the time
to complete M&A deals. Acquirers are more likely to use stock for pay-
ments during periods of high policy uncertainty. Furthermore, policy
uncertainty is positively associated with the acquirer’s abnormal return
around the announcement date, and this is due to the acquirer’s prudence
during the high policy uncertainty period. Bonaime et al., (2018) show
that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with M&A activities, and
that this negative relationship is mainly due to the real option channel.
3. Hypotheses development
Economic policy uncertainty increases corporate operational and in-
vestment risk, and the cost of capital. M&As require large amount of
capital and thus tend to be irreversible investment. Pastor and Veronesi
(2013), Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Brogaard and Detzel (2015) show that
uncertainty could increase the costs of capital. Furfine and Rosen (2011)
and Phan (2014) show that policy uncertainty is inclined to stimulate the
acquirers’ default risk. From the real options framework, Bernanke
(1983), Rodrik (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that firms are
more likely to delay irreversible investment under uncertainty. However,
these real options models ignore competitive interactions among agents.
Grenadier (2002) shows that competition could erode the value of the592option to wait. Yang and Meyer (2015) claim that the speed of action is
critical to gaining a competitive advantage in the fast-paced markets.
Although firm should delay irreversible investment under uncertainty,
the cost of waiting in a competitive market is high. Due to the highly
competitive environment in China (Luo, 2003; Williamson et al., 2004;
Gadiesh et al., 2007), M&As could be positively associated with uncer-
tainty. Based on the above argument, we propose the Hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 1. A firm is less likely to make acquisitions during periods
of high policy uncertainty. Alternatively, a firm is more likely to make
acquisitions during periods of high policy uncertainty.
During periods of high policy uncertainty, the cost of capital tends to
be high and the liquidity in the economy tends to be low, meaning that
firms are likely to be financially constrained. Besides, policy uncertainty
can exacerbate cash flow volatility, which makes companies more
vulnerable. Thus, firms pay more attention to their cash holdings during
periods of high policy uncertainty. Nguyen and Phan (2017) show that
acquirers are more likely to use stocks to pay their deals under high
policy uncertainty in order to reduce cash volatility. Thus, we hypothe-
size that:
Hypothesis 2A. Acquirers are more likely to use only stocks for their
M&A deals during periods of high policy uncertainty.
Hypothesis 2B. Acquirers are less likely to use only cash for their M&A
deals during periods of high policy uncertainty.
The above arguments suggest that acquisitions during periods of high
policy uncertainty can be risky, and, hence, firms should delay acquisi-
tions when facing policy uncertainty. However, the speed of action is
critical to gaining a competitive advantage in the fast-paced markets
(Njindan Iyke, 2019; Yang and Meyer, 2015). This means firms need to
find a balance between conducting risky acquisitions and gaining a
competitive advantage during periods of high policy uncertainty. In ef-
fect, firms become more prudent and conduct acquisitions that have
better expected outcomes during periods of high policy uncertainty. This
aside, the cost of financing is high during periods of high policy uncer-
tainty, and firms which make acquisitions tend to be more financially
healthy and are exploring investment opportunities to gain competitive
advantages. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. Acquisitions during periods of high economic policy
uncertainty are associated with an increase in shareholder value of
acquirers.
Deng et al. (2011) show a positive relationship between the promo-
tion of large SOEs managers who are loyal to the government and
corporate performance. Thus, when the economic policy is unclear, the
cost of making a mistake or wrong investment is higher for SOEmanagers
than non-SOE mangers. SOEs should be more prudent when making in-
vestment decisions than non-SOEs during periods of high economic
policy uncertainty. Furthermore, Li and Cheng (2020) show that firms
that have political capital are less concerned about competition, since
they have competitive advantages such as government protection against
competitors (see also Allen et al., 2005; Bai et al., 2006) and favorable
bank loans (see also Claessens et al., 2008; Houston et al., 2014). Thus,
SOEs should be less likely to make acquisitions than non-SOEs during
periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Given the prudence of SOEs
regarding acquisitions relative to non-SOEs during high policy uncer-
tainty periods, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4. Acquisitions made by SOEs are associated with a larger
increase in shareholder value than acquisitions made by non-SOEs during
high economic policy uncertainty periods.
Table 1
The distribution of M&A deals.
Panel A: The distribution of M&A deals by year
Year Frequency Percentage
2001 8 0.19
2002 142 3.39
2003 73 1.74
2004 77 1.84
2005 131 3.13
2006 133 3.18
2007 162 3.87
2008 147 3.51
2009 171 4.08
2010 276 6.59
2011 266 6.35
2012 299 7.14
2013 376 8.98
2014 351 8.38
2015 417 9.96
2016 342 8.17
2017 446 10.65
2018 371 8.86
Total 4188 100
Panel B: The distribution of M&A deals by industry
Industry Frequency Percentage
Consumer Discretionary 667 15.93
Consumer Staples 227 5.42
Energy 102 2.44
Health Care 396 9.46
Industrials 1122 26.79
Information Technology 628 15.00
Materials 701 16.74
Real Estate 338 8.07
Telecommunication Services 7 0.17
Total 4188 100
Panel C: The distribution of M&A deals by payment method
Payment method Frequency Percentage
Cash 3300 78.80
Cash and Stock 348 8.31
Stock 414 9.89
Undisclosed 126 3.01
Total 4188 100
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std.
Dev
Q1 Median Q3 N
Panel A: Full Sample
EPU 5.07 0.57 4.57 5.02 5.51 29,588
ROA 0.06 0.43 0.03 0.06 0.09 29,588
Firm size 21.69 1.28 20.81 21.54 22.38 29,588
Cash to total assets 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.23 29,588
Book leverage 0.48 1.20 0.28 0.44 0.60 29,588
Market-to-book ratio 4.78 297.39 1.48 2.10 3.28 29,588
Past 12-months
returns
0.23 0.81 0.25 0.01 0.46 29,588
Panel B: M&A Subsample
EPU 5.11 0.57 4.57 5.13 5.51 4188
ROA 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.10 4188
Firm size 21.75 1.22 20.89 21.61 22.43 4188
Cash to total assets 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.25 4188
Book leverage 0.45 0.38 0.26 0.44 0.60 4188
Market-to-book ratio 3.10 15.12 1.51 2.18 3.39 4188
Past 12-months
returns
0.30 0.86 0.22 0.02 0.53 4188
Panel C: Non-M&A Subsample
EPU 5.06 0.57 4.57 5.02 5.51 25,400
ROA 0.05 0.46 0.03 0.05 0.09 25,400
Firm size 21.68 1.28 20.80 21.53 22.37 25,400
Cash to total assets 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.22 25,400
Book leverage 0.48 1.28 0.28 0.44 0.61 25,400
Market-to-book ratio 5.06 320.92 1.47 2.09 3.26 25,400
Past 12-months
returns
0.22 0.79 0.25 0.01 0.45 25,400
Note: This table reports the summary statistics on the key variables used in this
study. Panels A, B, and C show, respectively, the summary statistics for the full
sample, the subsample including only firm-year observations with completed
M&A deals, and the subsample of all the firm-year observations with no M&A
deals. The variable definitions are reported in the Appendix.
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We collect all the M&A deals in China between from the period of
2001–20181 from Bloomberg. Firm’s accounting data are from the Wind
database. We obtain daily stock return data from CSMAR (China Stock
Market & Accounting Research database). After filtering the M&A deals,
our sample contains 4188 completed M&A deals from January 2001 to
December 2018. Following Fuller et al. (2002) and Zhou et al. (2015), the
filtering process is as follows: 1) Acquirers are public listed Chinese
companies on the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchanges; 2) Acquirers
that belong to the financial or utility industry are excluded from the
sample because they are highly regulated; 3) If acquirers made multiple
M&A deals within one year, we only include the first deal; 4) M&A deals
with a deal value below 5 million RMB are excluded from our sample; 5)
Acquirers that do not have complete accounting data required for the
analysis are excluded from our sample.
The distribution of M&A deals is shown in Table 1. Panels A, B, and C,
show, respectively the distribution of M&A deals by year, industry, and
payment method. The number of M&A deals increased steadily over the
period from 2001 to 2018, but drop significantly during 2003 and 2004.
In terms of the industry distribution, acquirers are mainly in consumer1 This is the globalization era in China with rapid development in the financial
market.
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other extreme, only 0.17% of the acquirers are in the telecommunication
services industry. In terms of the payment method, the majority of the
deals are paid in cash.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the key variables used in this
study. The sample consists of 4188 M&A deals of 2041 unique Chinese
firms. Panels A, B, and C, show, respectively the summary statistics for
the full sample, the subsample including only firm-year observations
with completed M&A deals, and for the subsample of all the firm-year
observations with no M&A deals. The definition of variables and con-
struction methods are reported in the Appendix. By comparing the
summary statistics between M&A subsample and non-M&A subsample,
we observe that firms which made acquisitions have higher return on
asset (ROA), have larger size, have higher cash to total assets ratio, lower
book leverage, lower market-to-book ratio, and have higher past 12-
months stock returns. Besides, M&As tend to happen during periods of
high economic policy uncertainty.
To measure economic policy uncertainty, we use the EPU index of
China developed by Baker et al. (2013) and BBD (2016). This EPU index
is constructed based on the frequency count of keywords related to policy
uncertainty that appear in the SCMP.2 The SCMP is Hong Kong’s leading
English-language newspaper. The benefit of using such EPU index is that
SCMP is less subjective to government censorship from mainland China,
since the media in Hong Kong is not regulated by Mainland China. Fig. 1
plots the EPU index from the period of 2000–2018. The EPU index surged
after 2016, which could be due to Brexit, Trump Inauguration and the
trade war between China and US.2 Please refer to BBD (2016) and Baker et al. (2013) for the detailed
methodology.
Fig. 1. Economic policy uncertainty index.
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5.1. Economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of making acquisitions
To investigate the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the
likelihood of making acquisitions, we use the following panel probit
model:
M&A Dummyi,t ¼ αþβ  EPUt-1 þ λ  Controli,t-1 þγ  Industry-fixed effect
þεi,t (1)
Where M&A Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i
made acquisition announcement in year t, and 0 otherwise. EPU is the
natural logarithm of the average of EPU index over the last 6-months of
the preceding year. We follow Nguyen and Phan (2017) and Bonaime
et al. (2018) for the choice of control variables including market-to-book
ratio, book leverage, firm size, ROA, cash to total assets ratio, stock return
over the last 12 months. We use the one-year lag values of all the control
variables since the decision of making an acquisition is based on past
information. We expect larger, more financially healthy firms (higher
cash to total assets ratio, lower leverage), and firms with better growth
opportunities (higher ROA, higher market-to-book ratio, higher past
stock returns) to make acquisitions. We also include SOE dummy, which
takes a value of 1 if the firm is state-owned, and 0 otherwise. The SOE
dummy and the interaction between the SOE dummy and EPU are used to
verify the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs. We further control for
industry effect. Following follow Nguyen and Phan (2017), we did not
include the year fixed-effects. Firms are subject to the same economic
policy uncertainty in a given year, meaning that including year
fixed-effects could capture most of the explanatory power of economic
policy uncertainty. However, we control for proxies of macroeconomics
factors and year fixed-effects in the robustness check section.5.2. Economic policy uncertainty and the payment method of M&A deals
To investigate the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the
payment method of M&A deals, we use the following cross-sectional
probit model:594Stock dummyij ¼ αþβ  EPUt-1 þ λ  Controlit-1 þγ  Industry-fixed effect
þεi,t (2)
Cash dummyij ¼ αþβ  EPUt-1 þ λ  Controlit-1 þγ  Industry-fixed effect
þεi,t (3)
Where Stock dummy takes a value of 1 if the payment method is only
stock for M&A deal j of firm i, and 0 otherwise. Cash dummy takes a value
of 1 if the payment method is only cash for M&A deal j of firm i, and
0 otherwise. EPU is the natural logarithm of the average of EPU index
over the last 6-months of the preceding year. Following the same argu-
ment in Section 5.1 for the choice of control variables, we include
market-to-book ratio, book leverage, firm size, ROA. cash to total assets
ratio, and stock return over the last 12 months. We use the one-year lag
values of all the control variables. The SOE dummy and the interaction
between the SOE dummy and EPU are used to verify the difference be-
tween SOEs and non-SOEs. We further control of industry effect. In this
analysis, we use the M&A subsamples, which only include firm-year
observations that have completed M&A deals.
5.3. Economic policy uncertainty and acquirers’ shareholder value
This part of the study aims to examine the effect of economic policy
uncertainty on the acquirers’ shareholder value. Event study method is
used to examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the
acquirers’ short-term abnormal stock returns.
The expected returns are calculated by using the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), whereas abnormal returns (AR) are calculated by taking
the difference between actual returns and expected returns. The formula
for calculating AR is as follows:
ARi;t ¼Ri;t 
bαi þ bβ iRm  rf þ rf i;t (4)
where ARi;t is the abnormal return for stock i in day t. Ri;t is the actual
return of stock i in day t. ðbαi þ bβ iðRm  rf Þ þ rf Þi;t is the expected return of
stock i in day t based on the CAPM. bαi and bβ i are estimated based on 250
trading days, which is from 270 trading days before the announcement
date to 20 trading days before the announcement date. Within the 250
trading days, we only keep the estimations if the stock returns are
available for at least 150 trading days.
Y. Sha et al. Economic Modelling 89 (2020) 590–600Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by summing up
abnormal return over the event window period:
CARi;T ¼
Xi¼T
i¼1
ARi;t (5)
where CARi;T is the cumulative abnormal return for stock i for T days of
event window. We choose three event windows: 1) 1 day before
announcement date to 1 day after announcement date: (1,þ1); 2) 3
days before announcement date to 3 days after announcement date:
(3,þ3); 3) 5 days before announcement date to 5 days after
announcement date: (5,þ5).
Within each event window, we drop observations if there are missing
stock returns within the event window.
After calculating CAR, we employed cross-sectional regression to test
whether economic policy uncertainty has an effect on CAR. Following
Nguyen and Phan (2017), we use the following cross-sectional ordinary
least squares regressions:
CAR11ij ¼ αþβ  EPUt-1 þ λ  Controlit-1 þεi,t (6)
CAR33ij ¼ αþβ  EPUt-1 þ λ  Controlit-1 þεi,t (7)
CAR55ij ¼ αþβ  EPUt-1 þ λ  Controlit-1 þεi,t (8)
Where CAR11ij is the CAR for M&A deal j of firm i with event window
(1,1), CAR33ij is the CAR for M&A deal j of firm i with event windowTable 3
Economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of making acquisitions.
(1) (2)
M&A dummy M&A dummy
EPU 0.092*** (5.34) 0.095*** (4.91)
SOE 0.306 (1.58)
EPU*SOE 0.091** (2.37)
Cash to total assets 0.482*** (7.18) 0.487*** (7.35)
Firm size 0.026*** (3.46) 0.039*** (4.99)
Leverage 0.032 (1.18) 0.022 (1.03)
Market-to-book ratio 0.000 (0.02) 0.000 (0.02)
ROA 0.077 (1.56) 0.069 (1.50)
Past 12-months returns 0.081*** (7.19) 0.078*** (6.88)
Constant 2.260*** (13.58) 2.524*** (14.30)
Industry control Yes Yes
N 29,588 29,588
pseudo R2 0.008 0.010
Note: This table reports the panel probit regression results of equation (1). T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are reported in the
Appendix.
Table 4
Economic policy uncertainty and the payment method of M&A deals.
(1) (2)
Stock dummy Stock dum
EPU 0.035 (0.67) 0.060 (
SOE 0.862 (
EPU*SOE 0.270** (2
Cash to total assets 0.683*** (2.90) 0.761***
Firm size 0.174*** (5.68) 0.216***
Leverage 0.608*** (3.65) 0.486*** (
Market-to-book ratio 0.002** (2.40) 0.002** (2
ROA 0.594 (1.11) 0.430 (
Past 12-months returns 0.004 (0.12) 0.004 (0.1
Constant 2.467*** (3.95) 3.440*** (
Industry control Yes Yes
N 4055 4055
pseudo R2 0.046 0.069
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional probit regression results of equations (2) an
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are reported in the
595(3,3) and CAR55ij is the CAR for M&A deal j of firm i with event
window (5,5). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average of EPU index
over the last 6-months of the preceding year. Following the same argu-
ment in Section 5.1 for the choice of control variables, we include
market-to-book ratio, book leverage, firm size, ROA. cash to total assets
ratio, stock return over the last 12months. We use the one-year lag values
of all the control variables. In addition, we include the stock and cash
dummies, since the payment method may affect the abnormal returns.
The SOE dummy and the interaction between the SOE dummy and EPU
are used to verify the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs. In this
analysis, we use the M&A subsamples, which only include firm-year
observations that have completed M&A deals.
6. Empirical results
6.1. Economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of making acquisitions
Table 3 shows the estimates of equation (1). Column (1) shows the
baseline regression analyzing the relationship between economic policy
uncertainty and the likelihood of making acquisitions. Column (2) adds
the SOE dummy and the interaction between EPU and the SOE dummy.
The coefficients of EPU are positive and significant in both regressions.
This indicates that firms are more likely to make acquisitions during
periods of high economic policy uncertainty, and thus supporting Hy-
pothesis 1. The sign of the EPU coefficients is in the opposite direction
relative to Nguyen and Phan (2017), who found a negative relationship
between economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of making ac-
quisitions. As we argued in Section 3, firms in China may behavior
differently when compare to US firms during periods of high economic
policy uncertainty. The coefficient of the interaction between EPU and
the SOE dummy is negative and significant, indicating that SOEs are less
likely than non-SOEs to make acquisitions during periods of high eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. These results are consistent with our expec-
tation that SOEs are more prudent than non-SOEs when making
acquisition decisions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty.
Regarding control variables, the coefficients of cash to asset ratio,
firm size, and last 12-months stock returns are positive and significant,
indicating that larger firms, and firms with more cash and higher past
stock returns tend to make acquisitions.
6.2. Economic policy uncertainty and the payment method of M&A deals
Table 4 shows the regression results of equations (2) and (3). Column
(1) shows the baseline regression analyzing the relationship between
economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of using stock only as
payment method. Column (2) adds the SOE dummy and the interaction
between EPU and the SOE dummy. Column (3) shows the baseline(3) (4)
my Cash dummy Cash dummy
1.00) 0.106** (2.41) 0.075 (1.52)
1.62) 1.054** (2.17)
.57) 0.261*** (2.72)
(3.19) 0.623*** (3.43) 0.646*** (3.56)
(6.89) 0.203*** (8.43) 0.229*** (9.26)
3.02) 0.150*** (3.20) 0.123*** (2.62)
.20) 0.001 (1.31) 0.001 (1.19)
0.86) 1.024* (1.95) 0.901* (1.83)
0) 0.079*** (2.96) 0.085*** (3.22)
5.34) 3.073*** (5.94) 3.735*** (6.98)
Yes Yes
4062 4062
0.047 0.053
d (3). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at
Appendix.
Table 5
Economic policy uncertainty and acquirers’ shareholder value.
(1) (2) (3)
CAR11 CAR33 CAR55
EPU 0.588*** (13.35) 1.351*** (13.05) 2.058*** (12.58)
SOE 1.268***
(3.19)
3.084***
(3.32)
5.325***
(3.59)
EPU*SOE 0.241*** (3.14) 0.586*** (3.26) 1.007*** (3.51)
Stock 0.623 (1.09) 0.554 (0.44) 0.024 (0.01)
Cash 0.315 (0.69) 0.694 (0.68) 0.745 (0.37)
Cash to total assets 0.562***
(3.42)
1.212***
(3.07)
1.740***
(2.79)
Firm size 0.064***
(2.79)
0.142***
(2.63)
0.186**
(2.20)
Leverage 0.004 (0.04) 0.021 (0.06) 0.332 (0.62)
Market-to-book
ratio
0.044***
(3.08)
0.108***
(3.01)
0.192***
(3.53)
ROA 0.019 (0.05) 0.327 (0.31) 1.104 (0.69)
Past 12-months
returns
0.056 (1.59) 0.136* (1.67) 0.267**
(2.05)
Constant 1.600**
(2.33)
3.717**
(2.42)
5.766**
(2.09)
N 2666 2571 2478
adj. R2 0.118 0.123 0.131
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional ordinary least square regression re-
sults of equations (6)–(8). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variable
definitions are reported in the Appendix.
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Y. Sha et al. Economic Modelling 89 (2020) 590–600regression analyzing the relationship between economic policy uncer-
tainty and the likelihood of using cash only as payment method. Column
(4) adds the SOE dummy and the interaction between EPU and the SOE
dummy. We did not find consistent results that economic policy uncer-
tainty has a significant effect on the payment method, and thus our re-
sults refute Hypothesis 2A and 2B. However, the interaction between
EPU and the SOE dummy is positive and significant in column (2) and
negative and significant in column (4), indicating that SOEs are more
likely than non-SOEs to use only stock as payment method during periods
of high economic policy uncertainty. Furthermore, SOEs are less likely
than non-SOEs to use only cash as payment method during periods of
high economic policy uncertainty. These results are consistent with our
expectation that SOEs are more prudent when making acquisitions dur-
ing high economic policy uncertainty periods.
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of cash to total assets
ratio is negative and significant if the dependent variable is the stock
dummy, and is positive and significant if the dependent variable is the
cash dummy. This indicates that firms with more cash are more likely to
use only cash and less likely to use only stock as payment method. The
coefficient of firm size is negative and significant if the dependent vari-
able is the stock dummy, and is positive and significant if the dependent
variable is the cash dummy. This indicates that larger firms are more
likely to use only cash and less likely to use only stock as payment
method. The coefficient of book leverage is positive and significant if the
dependent variable is the stock dummy, and is negative and significant if
the dependent variable is the cash dummy. This indicates that more
leveraged firms are more likely to use only stock and less likely to use
only cash as payment method. The coefficient of ROA is positive and
significant if the dependent variable is the cash dummy. This indicates
that more profitable firms are more likely to use only cash as payment
method. The coefficient of last 12-months stock returns is negative and
significant if the dependent variable is the cash dummy. This indicates
that firms with higher past stock returns are more likely to use only cash
as payment method. The results are intuitive because larger firms tend to
have better access to the capital market, and have the capacity to pay
cash for their acquisitions. High leverage can be interpreted as financial
constraint, thus more financially constrained firms have less capacity to
pay cash for their acquisitions. More profitable firms are less likely to be
financially constrained and have the capacity to pay cash for their596acquisitions. Furthermore, for acquirers with higher last 12 months stock
returns, the target may think the acquires’ stock price is overvalued and
is more willing to accept cash payments.6.3. Economic policy uncertainty and acquirers’ shareholder value
Table 5 shows the regression results of cumulative abnormal returns.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the result of event windows with 3 days, 7
days, and 11 days, respectively. The coefficient of EPU is significant and
positive in all the regressions. This indicates that economic policy un-
certainty is positively associated with acquirers’ shareholder value. This
result supports Hypothesis 3 and is consistent with Nguyen and Phan
(2017). The longer the event window, the larger the coefficient of EPU.
This indicates that the stock market in China is not efficient, the
announcement effect on the stock returns tends to be persistent. The
coefficient of the interaction between EPU and the SOE dummy is sig-
nificant and positive, indicating that acquisitions made by SOEs are
associated with a larger increase in shareholder value than acquisitions
made by non-SOEs during periods of high economic policy uncertainty.
The regression results in Section 6.1 and 6.2 show that SOEs are more
prudent than non-SOEs when making acquisitions during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty, which is consistent with our expectation
and supports Hypothesis 4.
Regarding the control variables, the SOE dummy is significant and
negative indicating that SOEs, on average, create less shareholder wealth
compare with non-SOEs, when making acquisitions. Firm size is signifi-
cant and negative indicating that larger firms create less shareholder
wealth when making acquisitions. Market-to-book ratio is significant and
negative indicating that firms with more growth opportunities create less
shareholder wealth when making acquisitions.
7. Robustness check
7.1. Controlling for omitted variable bias and endogeneity
There could be unobserved factors related to investment opportu-
nities and economic development that are correlated with both economic
policy uncertainty and M&A activities. This raises concerns regarding
omitted variable bias in our panel probit regression results in Section 6.1.
To address this concern, we re-run the panel probit regression controlling
for the macroeconomic conditions and time fixed-effects. Following
Nguyen and Phan (2017), we use real gross domestic product (GDP)
growth and Leading Macroeconomic Prosperity (LDP) Index as proxies
for macroeconomic conditions.3 Table 6 shows the results of the panel
probit regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), we controlled for real GDP
growth and its coefficient is significant and positive indicating that firms
are more likely to make acquisitions when the real GDP growth is high.
Columns (3) and (4) controlled for LDP index and its coefficient is
insignificant. Columns (5) and (6) controlled for time fixed-effects, which
is captured by year dummy variables. After controlling for macroeco-
nomic conditions and time fixed-effects, the coefficient of EPU remains
positive and significant, whereas the coefficient of EPU*SOE remains
negative and significant indicating that our results are robust to
omitted-variable-bias concerns.
Even after controlling for these macroeconomic conditions and time
fixed-effects, there could be other unobserved factors that are correlated
with both economic policy uncertainty and M&A activities and thus raise
further endogeneity concerns. To address these concerns, we run an
instrumental variable (IV) probit model. Following Wang et al. (2014),
we use the two-year lag of the US EPU index as the instrument for China’sData for real GDP growth and LDP index are collected from CSMAR.
Table 6
Economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of making acquisitions controlling for macroeconomic conditions and time fixed-effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M&A dummy M&A dummy M&A dummy M&A dummy M&A dummy M&A dummy
EPU 0.150*** (5.82) 0.160*** (5.94) 0.094*** (5.33) 0.096*** (4.87) 0.928*** (8.89) 0.924*** (8.89)
SOE 0.262 (1.37) 0.309 (1.59) 0.454** (2.29)
EPU*SOE 0.084** (2.21) 0.092** (2.38) 0.117*** (2.98)
Cash to total assets 0.481*** (7.11) 0.487*** (7.31) 0.482*** (7.19) 0.487*** (7.35) 0.423*** (6.15) 0.426*** (6.26)
Firm size 0.029*** (3.84) 0.043*** (5.51) 0.026*** (3.39) 0.039*** (4.93) 0.013 (1.63) 0.026*** (3.22)
Leverage 0.039 (1.27) 0.029 (1.13) 0.031 (1.17) 0.022 (1.02) 0.042 (1.40) 0.033 (1.30)
Market-to-book ratio 0.000 (0.15) 0.000 (0.84) 0.000 (0.03) 0.000 (0.01) 0.000 (0.06) 0.000 (0.16)
ROA 0.078 (1.56) 0.070 (1.51) 0.077 (1.55) 0.069 (1.50) 0.080 (1.55) 0.073 (1.50)
Past 12-months returns 0.085*** (7.47) 0.082*** (7.24) 0.081*** (7.19) 0.078*** (6.88) 0.057*** (3.84) 0.056*** (3.72)
Real GDP growth 0.023*** (2.94) 0.026*** (3.45)
LDP index 0.002 (0.57) 0.001 (0.31)
Constant 2.814*** (11.27) 3.166*** (12.42) 2.091*** (6.14) 2.433*** (7.05) 6.730*** (11.57) 6.985*** (12.02)
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time control No No No No Yes Yes
N 29,588 29,588 29,588 29,588 29,588 29,588
pseudo R2 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.023 0.024
Note: This table reports the panel probit regression results of equation (1) controlling for macroeconomic conditions and time fixed-effects. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are reported in the Appendix.
Table 7
IV probit model of Economic policy uncertainty and the likelihood of making
acquisitions.
(1) (2) (3)
First Stage Second Stage Second Stage
EPU M&A dummy M&A dummy
EPU in US 0.410*** (41.46)
Instrumented EPU 0.348*** (4.74) 0.406*** (4.79)
Instrumented
EPU*SOE
0.300**
(2.54)
SOE 1.403** (2.36)
Cash to total assets 0.077*** (3.42) 0.441*** (6.48) 0.445*** (6.53)
Firm size 0.099*** (40.11) 0.002 (0.14) 0.010 (0.82)
Leverage 0.017***
(4.84)
0.027 (1.07) 0.017 (0.75)
Market-to-book ratio 0.000*** (5.65) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.05)
ROA 0.052*** (3.29) 0.062 (1.33) 0.051 (1.09)
Past 12-months
returns
0.137***
(35.55)
0.126*** (7.58) 0.120*** (7.04)
Constant 2.751***
(27.70)
1.560***
(7.64)
1.964***
(7.75)
Industry control Yes Yes Yes
N 29,588 29,588 29,588
adj. R2 0.180
pseudo R2 0.008 0.010
Note: This table reports the IV probit regression results of equation (1). T-sta-
tistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are reported in the
Appendix.
Table 8
Economic policy uncertainty and acquirers’ shareholder value.
(1) (2) (3)
CAR11 CAR33 CAR55
EPU 0.596*** 1.363*** 2.031***
(11.21) (10.77) (9.81)
SOE -1.212** -3.002*** -5.479***
(-2.51) (-2.72) (-3.13)
EPU*SOE 0.226** 0.564** 1.047***
(2.24) (2.44) (2.86)
Stock 0.625 0.557 0.020
(1.47) (0.57) (0.01)
Cash 0.316 0.694 0.747
(0.82) (0.79) (0.48)
Cash to total assets -0.507** -1.133** -1.897**
(-2.02) (-1.99) (-2.04)
Firm size -0.056 -0.131 -0.209
(-1.63) (-1.64) (-1.62)
Leverage -0.005 -0.025 -0.322
(-0.05) (-0.08) (-0.65)
Market-to-book ratio -0.046*** -0.112*** -0.183***
(-2.99) (-2.97) (-2.96)
ROA -0.004 -0.307 -1.147
(-0.01) (-0.33) (-0.78)
Past 12-months returns -0.048 -0.126 -0.287**
Y. Sha et al. Economic Modelling 89 (2020) 590–600EPU index. Similar to the measurement of China’s EPU index, we use the
natural logarithm of the average of the EPU index over the last 6-months
in any particular year. Table 7 reports the regression results. Column (1)
and (2) report the first and second stage estimates of the IV probit model,
respectively. The coefficient of the US EPU index is significant and pos-
itive, suggesting that this instrument is relevant. Column (3) reports the
second stage results when the SOE dummy and EPU*SOE interaction
term are included in the model.4 The coefficient of the instrumented EPU
remains positive and significant, while the coefficient of the instru-
mented EPU*SOE term remains negative and significant suggesting that4 For brevity, we did not report the first stage estimations. The results are
available on request. The natural candidate instrument for the interaction be-
tween the SOE dummy and EPU is the interaction between the SOE dummy and
US EPU index.
597our results are robust to endogeneity concerns.
7.2. Controlling for self-selection bias
The cross-sectional regressions of CAR may be prone to self-selection
bias because M&As are managers’ decisions rather than a random
assignment. To address the self-selection bias concern, we use the
Heckman (1979) two-step self-selection correction model. Specifically,
we include the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR)—which is calculated using the
coefficient estimates of the panel probit model on the likelihood of
making acquisitions—as an additional control variable in our model.
Table 8 shows the results using Heckman two-step self-selection correc-
tion model. The conclusion regarding acquirers’ shareholder value re-
mains intact, and hence our finding is not sensitive to self-selection bias.(-1.27) (-1.43) (-2.04)
Inverse Mill Ratio 0.108 0.159 -0.312
(0.29) (0.19) (-0.23)
Constant -1.998 -4.318 -4.576
(-1.34) (-1.27) (-0.81)
N 2666 2571 2478
adj. R2 0.122 0.127 0.134
Table 10
The alternative EPU index and payment method of M&A deals.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock dummy Stock dummy Cash dummy Cash dummy
PU 0.134* (1.80) 0.175* (1.90) 0.156**
(2.56)
0.114
(1.61)
SOE 0.392
(0.55)
1.317**
(2.11)
PU*SOE 0.199 (1.28) 0.344**
(2.53)
Cash to total
assets
0.669***
(2.86)
0.741***
(3.09)
0.653***
(3.60)
0.667***
(3.68)
Firm size 0.185***
(6.05)
0.228***
(7.27)
0.202***
(8.41)
0.227***
(9.24)
Leverage 0.650***
(3.96)
0.527***
(3.25)
0.144***
(3.07)
0.118**
(2.46)
Market-to-
book ratio
0.002**
(2.10)
0.002* (1.95) 0.001
(1.52)
0.001
(1.41)
ROA 0.605
(1.14)
0.453
(0.91)
1.019* (1.95) 0.903* (1.84)
Past 12-
months
returns
0.014 (0.43) 0.017 (0.53) 0.072***
(2.84)
0.074***
(2.92)
Constant 1.877***
(2.98)
2.547***
(3.69)
2.866***
(5.45)
3.563***
(6.33)
Industry
control
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4055 4055 4062 4062
pseudo R2 0.047 0.071 0.047 0.053
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional probit regression results of equations
(2) and (3) based on the alternative EPU index. T-statistics are reported in pa-
rentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The variable definitions are reported in the Appendix.
Table 11
The alternative EPU index and acquirers’ shareholder value.
(1) (2) (3)
CAR11 CAR33 CAR55
EPU 0.182*** (3.07) 0.426*** (3.14) 0.631*** (2.99)
SOE 1.039**
(1.97)
2.526**
(2.08)
4.778**
(2.52)
EPU*SOE 0.189* (1.67) 0.463* (1.78) 0.901** (2.20)
Stock 0.656 (1.09) 0.638 (0.48) 0.274 (0.11)
Cash 0.319 (0.66) 0.707 (0.66) 0.953 (0.44)
Cash to total assets 0.742***
(4.17)
1.703***
(4.03)
2.515***
(3.76)
Firm size 0.039* (1.68) 0.102* (1.89) 0.186** (2.24)
Leverage 0.244**
(2.04)
0.722* (1.94) 1.467***
(2.67)
Market-to-book
ratio
0.008 (0.60) 0.013 (0.40) 0.003 (0.08)
ROA 0.359 (0.81) 1.328 (1.16) 2.993* (1.73)
Past 12-months
returns
0.216***
(6.96)
0.506***
(6.84)
0.836***
(7.18)
Constant 1.593**
(2.14)
3.842**
(2.30)
6.003**
(2.02)
N 2666 2571 2478
adj. R2 0.049 0.053 0.062
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression re-
sults of equations (6)–(8) based on the alternative EPU index. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are reported in the Appendix.
Table 9
The alternative EPU index and the likelihood of making acquisitions.
(1) (2)
M&A dummy M&A dummy
EPU 0.186*** (8.41) 0.190*** (7.50)
SOE 0.361* (1.65)
EPU*SOE 0.110** (2.30)
Cash to total assets 0.449*** (6.71) 0.455*** (6.87)
Firm size 0.019** (2.53) 0.032*** (4.04)
Leverage 0.034 (1.28) 0.024 (1.14)
Market-to-book ratio 0.000 (0.01) 0.000 (0.01)
ROA 0.070 (1.46) 0.063 (1.40)
Past 12-months returns 0.079*** (7.09) 0.078*** (6.98)
Constant 2.487*** (14.71) 2.755*** (14.99)
Industry control Yes Yes
N 29,588 29,588
pseudo R2 0.010 0.012
Note: This table reports the panel probit regression results of equation (1) based
on the alternative EPU index. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The variable
definitions are reported in the Appendix.
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Although the EPU index based on the SCMP is less subjective to the
Mainland Chinese government censorship, the drawback of this index is
that it is only based on one newspaper. The best alternative measurement
of EPU is the index developed by Davis et al. (2019). This EPU index is
constructed based on the frequency of keywords related to policy un-
certainty appearing in two mainland Chinese newspapers, namely the
Renmin Daily and the Guangming Daily.5 We retest all the hypotheses
using this alternative EPU index.
Table 9 shows the results of panel probit regression in equation (1).
The coefficient of the EPU index remains positive and significant, while
the coefficient of EPU*SOE term remains negative and significant. These
results are consistent with the results in Table 3. Table 10 shows the
results based on the cross-sectional probit regression in equations (2) and
(3). If the dependent variable is the stock dummy, the results indicate
that firms are more likely to use only stock as payment method during
periods of high economic policy uncertainty. This supports Hypothesis
2A, which was refuted in Table 4. If the dependent variable is the cash
dummy, the results show that SOEs are less likely than non-SOEs to use
only cash as payment method during high economic policy uncertainty
periods, which is consistent with the results in Table 4. Table 11 shows
the results based on the cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions
of equations (6)–(8). These results suggest that the conclusion regarding
the acquirers’ shareholder value remains intact.
8. Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between economic policy un-
certainty and M&As in China. We addressed the following questions: 1)
How does economic policy uncertainty affect the likelihood of making
acquisition; 2) How does economic policy uncertainty affect the method
of payment of M&A deals; 3) How does economic policy uncertainty
affect the acquirers’ shareholder wealth. Using all listed Chinese com-
panies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as well as 4188
M&A deals from the period of 2001–2018, we show that Chinese firms
are more likely to make acquisitions during periods of high economic
policy uncertainty, which contradicts the behavior of US firms. We
further show that SOEs are less likely than non-SOEs to make acquisitions
during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Besides, SOEs are5 Please refer to BBD (2016) and Davis et al. (2019) for the detailed
methodology.
598less likely to use only cash for their acquisitions during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty. These results indicate the prudence of SOEs
regarding acquisitions relative to non-SOEs during periods of high eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. Lastly, acquisitions during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty are associated with an increase in share-
holder wealth for acquirers, and this wealth effect is more pronounced
for SOEs.
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Appendix. Variable Definitions
EPU (Economic policy uncertainty): The natural logarithm of the
average of EPU index over the last 6-months the year preceding an M&A
announcement.
Market-to-book ratio: Market-to-book ratio¼ (the market value of
equity þ the book value of assets - the book value of equity)/the book
value of assets.
Book leverage: Total debt divided by book value of assets.
Firm size: The natural logarithm of book value of assets.
ROA (return on asset): return on asset is measured by using net
profit divided by book value of assets.
Stock: Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the acquirer use stock
only as the payment method, otherwise 0.
Cash: Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the acquirer use cash only
as the payment method, otherwise 0.
SOE: Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the acquirer is SOE,
otherwise 0.
Cash to total assets: Total value of cash holding divided by book
value of assets.
Past 12-months returns: The buy-and-hold 12-months stock return
of the year preceding an M&A announcement.
CAR (Cumulative abnormal return): Cumulative abnormal return
around the announcement date. Three event windows are selected,
CAR11, CAR33 and CAR55 indicate (1, þ1), (3, þ3) and (5, þ5)
centred on the M&A announcement day, respectively.
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